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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3284 
_____________ 
 
SGS U.S. TESTING COMPANY, INC., 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TAKATA CORPORATION; TK HOLDINGS, INC.; JOHN DOE COMPANIES 
(1–50) 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District Court of New Jersey 
District Court No. 2-09-cv-06007 
District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2013 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 26, 2013) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
The appellant, SGS U.S. Testing Company, tests seatbelts and other 
 2 
 
products for its clients. Over a seventeen-year period, SGS tested nearly six 
hundred seatbelts for the appellees, Takata Corporation and its affiliates. Amid 
allegations that the tests were inadequate and the seatbelts unsafe, SGS and Takata 
were named as defendants in multiple class actions. None of the actions were 
successful. Before and after each action, SGS requested indemnification from 
Takata, and Takata denied all requests. Those denials led to this lawsuit.  
SGS sued Takata for contractual indemnification, breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, and common-law indemnification. The District Court 
dismissed the first and second claims for failure to state a claim and granted 
Takata‟s motion for summary judgment on the third claim. SGS appeals all three 
decisions. For the reasons that follow, we will reverse in part and affirm in part.
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SGS‟s first argument is that it has a valid claim for contractual 
indemnification. We review de novo a District Court‟s dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), applying the same standard as the District Court. 
See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). “Under Rule 
12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded 
                                           
1
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and 
we have final-order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties and the 
District Court assumed that New Jersey substantive law applies, and we see no 
reason to assume otherwise. See Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., 63 F.3d 166, 
180 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (concluding that “choice of law issues may be 
waived”). 
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allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, a court finds that [the] plaintiff‟s claims lack facial plausibility.” Id. 
(quoting Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
In exchange for SGS‟s testing services, Takata agreed to indemnify SGS.  
Indeed, the parties executed several contracts with various indemnification 
provisions over the years.  New Jersey‟s indemnification law distinguishes 
between vicarious-liability and independent-fault cases. Mantilla v. NC Mall 
Assocs., 770 A.2d 1144, 1149 (N.J. 2001).  In Mantilla, the Court “adopt[ed] the 
„after-the-fact‟ approach” to determine whether a party has defended against 
allegations of its independent fault.  Id. at 1149, 1151 (citing Cent. Motor Parts 
Corp. v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 596 A.2d 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1991)). This approach “permits an indemnitee to recover counsel fees if the 
indemnitee is adjudicated to be free from active wrongdoing regarding the 
plaintiff‟s injury, and has tendered the defense to the indemnitor at the start of the 
litigation.” Id. at 1151 (citing Cent. Motor Parts Corp., 596 A.2d at 769).  This 
does not mean that an indemnitee is automatically entitled to an award for the 
costs of defense.  Rather, as Kieffer v. Best Buy, 14 A.3d 737 (N.J. 2011), 
demonstrates, when the indemnitee has been adjudged free of any wrongdoing, the 
ability to recover depends upon the language of the contract.  Id. at 743-44 & n.6 
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(concluding that adjudication that owner, contractor and subcontractor were not 
negligent entitled indemnitee owner to indemnification based on expansive 
language indemnifying it from “any and all” claims, but that indemnitee contractor 
was not entitled to indemnification for costs of defense since contract with 
subcontractor required judicial finding of negligence by subcontractor).  If 
application of the after-the-fact approach establishes that an indemnitee “has been 
found to be at least partially at fault,” then the indemnitee “may not recover the 
costs of its defense from an indemnitor” unless there is explicit language in the 
indemnity contract.  Mantilla, 770 A.2d at 1145.   
Employing the “after-the-fact” approach here, it is evident that the 
complaint alleged that SGS, as indemnitee, was adjudicated free of wrongdoing 
and that it tendered the defense to Takata, the indemnitor, at the outset of the 
litigation.  See JA. 442 (¶¶14-24).  SGS, therefore, may be entitled to recover its 
defense costs depending upon the language of the various indemnity contracts.  
See Mantilla, 770 A.2d at 1151, Kieffer, 14 A.3d at 743-44.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the allegations in SGS‟s complaint were sufficient to state a claim 
for indemnification under New Jersey law and that the District Court erred by 
dismissing the claim.   
We note, however, that in New Jersey “[an] indemnitee may recover only 
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those fees and expenses attributable to the making of defenses which are not 
primarily directed toward rebutting charges of active negligence.”  Central Motor 
Parts Corp., 596 A.2d at 762 (quoting Piedmont Equip. Co. v. Eberhard Mfg. Co., 
665 P.2d 256, 258-259 (Nev. 1983)).  See also Piedmont, 665 P.2d at 260 (holding 
that an indemnitee who was “exonerated of liability at trial” was, nonetheless, only 
entitled to recover expenses not directed at rebutting charges of active negligence.)  
In this case, SGS incurred substantial expenses defending its testing methodology.  
On remand, the District Court will need to consider whether, in light of the 
language of the indemnification provisions, these expenses should be excluded 
from any recovery. 
SGS‟s second argument is that it also has a valid claim for breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. This duty “is implied in every contract in New 
Jersey.” Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (N.J. 2001). 
Conduct that is contrary to “community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness” violates the duty. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 205 cmt. a (1981)); see also id. at 1130 (“Bad motive or intention is essential.”). 
The District Court dismissed this claim because it concluded that SGS did not have 
a valid “claim for contractual indemnification.” JA. 16. As explained, that 
conclusion was wrong and the claim should not have been dismissed. 
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SGS‟s third and final argument is that the District Court improperly granted 
summary judgment on its common-law indemnification claim. For many of the 
reasons stated in the District Court‟s opinion, see JA. 41–46, we conclude that 
summary judgment was proper. 
In sum, we will affirm the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment on SGS‟s common-law indemnification claim. But we will reverse its 
order dismissing SGS‟s claims for contractual indemnification and breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, and we will remand for further proceedings. 
 
 
